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TECHNICAL PAPER 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS OF FLYING THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
WITH AND WITHOUT FUEL TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE 
REDLINE PROTECTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Operation of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) in the presence of possible turbine 
overtemperature events and temperature sensor failures entails a measurable risk. Turbine discharge 
temperature sensors are employed in detecting turbine overtemperatures in the SSME. These sensors have 
a history of unreliability during both ground test and flight. Moreover, there have been several 
overtemperature events in the SSME during ground tests which are believed to have the potential to occur 
during launch. 
Therefore, in order to make informed design and flight policy decisions concerning overtempera- 
tures, it is important to calculate both the risk of an erroneous engine shutdown and the risk of an undetected 
overtemperature event as a result of sensor failures or redline protection inhibit. 
This paper presents the results of a reliability study of these risks and the mathematical model that 
was developed to compute the desired probabilities. 
A Monte Carlo computer simulation was programmed as a check on the analytical model and is also 
included. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The SSME provides measurements of turbine discharge temperatures in both the High Pressure 
Fuel Turbine (HPFT) and the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine (HPOT). Two sensors (Fig. 1) in each 
turbine are utilized within the SSME control and monitoring system by logic to shut down the engine when 
the measured temperature rises above a pre-set level during launch, or does not reach a pre-set level during 
start. The temperature must remain in this critical region for at least 40 msec in order to trip the engine 
protection shutdown logic which is an event referred to as “voting to cut.” This protection logic, known as 
redline(s), has been instrumental in protecting the SSME during its test history. 
Because the failure data indicate that the hazard of sensor failures and overtemperature events in the 
HPFT greatly overshadows the hazard of sensor failures and overtemperature events in the HPOT, this 
study is restricted to the fuel turbine. 
Germane to this analysis is the time required by the computer to classify a failing sensor as either 
being good or bad. A failing sensor whose reading is recognized as being impossible (greater than 2900 deg 
Rankine) is immediately recognized as being bad by the computer and is “disqualified,” a state in which it is 
henceforth ignored by the computer. It is noted that if both sensors are disqualified, a condition exists 
where the engine will continue to fire but there will be no means to detect an overtemperature event. 
A failing sensor can also read an erroneous temperature which drifts into the redline region for 
longer than 40 msec and, thus, trips the redline logic which produces a vote to cut. During this time, this 
sensor is still classified as good and its reading is thus falsely interpreted as warning of an overtemperature 
event and, if the other sensor has already been disqualified, would result in an erroneous engine shutdown. 
These two sensor failure states, referred to as disqualification and vote to cut, are illustrated in Figure 2. 
In the sensor Model 71 data base, 26 sensors experienced failures, 22 of which were immediately 
disqualified and 4 voted to cut. The 4 that voted to cut each falsely measured a temperature in the redline 
region long enough to cause a vote to cut. Each of these sensors’ temperature reading then jumped past 
2900 deg Rankine and were then disqualified. 
During flight, a premature engine shutdown can cause a mission abort which is considered an 
unsafe condition. On the other hand, launch without protection against a turbine overtemperature event, 
which is symptomatic of impending catastrophe, provides no means to thwart failure. Therefore, it is 
imperative that these two risks be analyzed to determine whether or not they are acceptable. 
111. METHODS 
Estimation of these risks requires the consideration of the reliability of the temperature sensors, the 
reliability of the HPFT relative to overheating, and of the computer’s voting logic in the presence of all 
possible failure scenarios of the sensors and the fuel turbine. Because the computer’s voting logic considers 
the sequence in which failures occur, the analysis must include the chronological variable time as well. 
The analysis will first develop the necessary reliability model for a single engine with two tempera- 
ture sensors in the HPFT. This result will then be used to compute the reliability of the Space Shuttle’s three 
engine configuration. Also, these risks will be computed using the Model 71 sensor and the Model 81 
sensor. This will show the improvement in overall reliability as a result of replacing the Model 7 1 sensor by 
the Model 81. 
Using the symbol (1) to represent the event that a sensor is disqualified, a (/) to denote the event of an 
erroneous vote to cut, and H to represent a fuel turbine overtemperature event, it can be seen that there are a 
total of 12 possible system states. These 12 cases are depicted in column 1 1 of Table 1 ; the horizontal axis 
denotes time in the units second and ranges from 0 to 520 sec and corresponds to the duration of a typical 
launch firing. Column 2 of the table gives an explanation of the state and column 3 gives the computer’s 
decision for that state. This decision is either continue to fire (CTF) or shut down (SD). Column 4 contains 
comments relevant to this study, e.g., erroneous engine shutdown. Note that state SI represents the 
nominal case in which no sensors fail and the fuel turbine temperature does not exceed the redline. States S6 
and S9 result in erroneous engine shutdown, and states S 1 1 and S 12 result in not shutting down an engine 
that should be shut down. 
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IV. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
A. Stat istical Assumptions 
When constructing a model which describes the computer voting logic in the presence of sensor 
failures and fuel turbine overtemperature events, a level of fidelity is required which accurately models the 
important aspects under investigation. These include realistic probability distributions for sensor failures 
and overtemperature events and the computer reaction to chronologically ordered combinations of these 
failures in terms of continuing to fire the engine or to shut it down. This is the most important step in the 
modeling process and anything which falls short of this goal will be of questionable value. 
It is believed that the pictorial model in Table 1 does indeed fulfill this requirement because it 
exactly parallels the computer voting logic in the presence of all possible combinations of sensor failures 
and overtemperature events. The following necessary assumptions are made about the probabilities 
associated with these failures which will then permit one to derive a set of equations that mathematically 
models the 12 states depicted in Table 1. 
1 )  For the sensors' two failure states (disqualify and vote to cut), the probability that a 
particular sensor is disqualified or erroneously votes to cut in time At is A At and A2At, 
respectively, where the A'S have the dimension of failures per unit time. Specifically, the 
exponential time to failure model will be used which implies constant failure rates A I  and 
A2, i.e., no infant mortality or wearout effect. The Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF) is then given by l / A .  
Sensor failures and overtemperature events are statistically independent. That is, the 
failure of a sensor does not alter the probability that the remaining sensor fails nor does it 
alter the probability of a fuel turbine overtemperature event. 
The time to failure probability distribution for a HPFT overtemperature event follows a 
Weibull distribution. The choice of this two-parameter distribution provides the flexi- 
bility to model the possibility that the hazard of an overtemperature is not necessarily 
constant, e.g., an overtemperature event might be more likely to occur at the beginning 
of a mission rather than the end, or vice versa. However, as shall be seen later, the risks 
of interest are virtually insensitive to the Weibull assumption when compared with the 
simpler exponential time to failure model (constant hazard). 
4) A sensor that fails does not later recover and become operational again. 
B. Model Construction 
The "stick" figures in Table 1 which describe the 12 possible system states must now be mathe- 
matically modeled. Based on the assumptions discussed in the previous section, familiar techniques used in 
the study of stochastic processes are applied. The method to be employed here is referred to as the 
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Compound-Event Approach [ 13 which leads directly to multiple integral expressions for the state prob- 
abilities in terms of the system hazards. For the particular state (S 12), the probability that a failing sensor 
votes to cut is derived, the other sensor is later disqualified, and then sometime later, there is a fuel turbine 
overtemperature event. This then represents one of the two state probabilities that contribute to the proh- 
ability of an overtemperature event going undetected (the other state is S1 1).  
Assume that the first event (erroneous vote to cut) occurs at some arbitrary time t = x the remain- 
ing sensor is disqualified at time t = x2, and then there is an overtemperature event at time t = x3, where x1 
< x2 < x3 d 520 sec. This is most easily visualized by reference to Figure 3a. Construction of P12(T) is 
formalized in Figure 3b and the solution, obtained by first integrating with respect to x l ,  then x2, followed 
by an integration by parts with respect to the variable x3 so as to remove the numerical difficulty involved 
when p < 1,  is given in Table 2. 
In a similar fashion, the other 11 state probabilities can be derived and are given in Table 2. Thus, 
although formulation is straightforward, computation is somewhat tedious. When the appropriate 
estimates of the parameters are inserted into these equations, the desired probabilities may then be 
computed. 
C. Estimation of Parameters 
Using the life data presented in References 2 and 3, the two sensor parameters and the two engine 
parameters which appear in the model can be estimated. 
The failure rate parameter for HPIT sensor disqualification is given by the number of dis- 
qualifications that have occurred in the HPIT divided by the cumulative time on both failed and unfailed 
HPFT sensors. 
Because the HPFT environment is believed to be significantly harsher than the HPOT environment 
on the sensors, only life data obtained from sensors used in the HPFT may be used to estimate these 
parameters. Hence, sensor failures and success time obtained from the HPOT side of the engine may not be 
used to estimate the failure rates for sensors which are located in the HPFT. The HPOT sensor life data may 
only be used to estimate the failure rates for sensors which are located in the HPOT. In this study it has been 
assumed that the HPOT is 100 percent reliable so that all life data from the HPOT (both sensor and 
overtemperature data) is not used to estimate any model parameters. 
Similarly, the vote to cut failure rate is estimated by the number of erroneous votes to cut originated 
by failing sensors in the HPFT divided by the cumulative time on both failed and unfailed HPFT sensors. 
For the Model 71 sensor, A, = 22/265,256.5 sec and A2 = 4/264,256.5 sec. For the Model 81 sensor, the 
failure rates are estimated to be hl = 2/64,342 sec and A2 = 5.65E-6. Because there have been no 
erroneous votes to cut with the Model 81 sensor, the assumption is made that the ratio of votes to cut 
to disqualifications has remained constant in the two sensor models. 
The two parameters of the Weibull distribution that were used as the time to failure model for 
turbine overtemperature events are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. The estimates of these 
parameters, which are called a and b, are determined from the numerical solution of the two simultaneous 
equations in terms of a and b: 
4 
. 
R S 
a - ~ /  ( .E tib + C tp) = o 
1 = 1  j = 1  
R 
R + C In t i -  
b i = l  
i = l  j = 1  
= o  
Reference 3 provides relevant engine data spanning a period from 1980 through January 27, 1986. 
This data presents 682 successful engine firings with 199,654.95 sec of cumulative firing time. Figure4 is a 
histogram of the duration times of the successful tests. Thus, almost 30 percent of the firings lasted about 
520 sec which is largely due to the inclusion of flight data. The data further includes 28 overtemperature 
events, six of which are believed to have the potential to occur during flight. The others either occurred 
during ground test screening or a design modification was made that would eliminate recurrence [3]. Five 
of the six overtemperatures occurred in the HPFT. Thus, R = 5, S = 682, and ti is the time of the ith HPFT 
overtemperature occurrence, i = 1,2,. . . ,R. Similarly, tj is the duration of the jth engine firing that did not 
experience an overtemperature event, j = 1,2,. . . ,S. Solving the two equations in terms of a and b yield the 
estimates a = 3.25E-4 and b = 0.566. 
Thus, the probability of no HPFT overtemperature event in a 520 sec single engine firing is 0.989 
and the probability of no overtemperature event during flight (three engines) is 0.967. Note that the data set 
shows about 0.7 percent failures (5 overtemperatures out of 687 firings) whereas the Weibull reliability 
model predicts 1 . 1  percent. The difference can be explained by observing that 67 percent of the data was for 
firings of duration much less than 500 sec, meaning that one would have expected more failures in the data 
set had every test lasted for 520 sec. It should also be noted that assuming an exponential tirne to  failure 
model for HPFT overtemperature events, the estimated reliability of a single engine firing for 520 sec 
would be 0.987, 
D. Monte Carlo Simulation 
A computer program was written which simulates the possibility of sensor failures, a HPFT 
overtemperature event, and the computer decision based on the programmed voting logic. The simulation 
is for a T = 520 sec period and thus represents a typical engine firing during a Space Shuttle launch. 
For each simulated flight, sensor failures and a HPFT overtemperature event are simulated accord- 
ing to the specified probability distributions. The time ordered sequence of failures are then examined to 
determine which one of the twelve states has occurred. The relative frequency of occurrence of each of the 
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states, obtained from performing the simulated launch many times, will then provide an estimate of each of 
the 12 state probabilities. If N launches are simulated with ni occurrences of state i, i = 1,2,. . . ,12, then an 
approximate (1-a) percent confidence interval for the true state probability pi is defined by the probability 
where Ci = ni/N and Zd2 is the critical value of a Gaussian distribution. 
In order to simulate possible sensor failures and HPFT overtemperature events, one must first 
generate two failure times as tA,1 = -(In Ul)/hl and tA.2 = -(In U2)/h2 where U 1  and U2 and all subsequent 
U’s are random numbers uniformly distributed between zero and one and the subscript A is used to denote 
one of the two sensors. Thus tA,l represents the time of disqualification and tA,2  the time of erroneous vote to 
cut for sensor A. Of course, since a failed sensor does not recover, only the earliest time makes physical 
sense. 
Hence, tA,i = min (tA.1 , tA,2) is defined so that i = 1 if tA,1 < tA,2 and thus yields a simulated 
disqualification. If tA,2 < tA, I then i = 2 and a vote to cut is given. It is further noted that if the failure time is 
greater than T, then sensor A does not fail at all, which is usually the case when the sensor failure rates are 
small. 
In a similar manner, the failure times are generated for the other sensor, labeled B, as tB,l = -(In 
U$hl and tB.2 = -(ln U4)/h2, and tB,j = min (tB,] , tB.2) is defined where j = 1 or 2 depending on similar 
conditions as for sensor A. 
The time of turbine overtemperature is simulated according to the Weibull distribution and is given 
by 
where the subscript H is used to denote “Hot.” 
For each simulated flight, the sensor failure times and the time of HPFT overtemperature event are 
generated and then checked to see if any failures have occurred during the 520 sec time period. If not, state 
S1 (the all good state) is recognized as having occurred and the simulation is repeated. If one or more 
failures have occurred, the time ordered sequence of failures is examined to determine which one of the 
remaining eleven states has occurred. Table 3 shows the twelve states and their defining characteristics in 
terms of sensor and HPlT failure states, relative time of failure, and the computer voting logic that results 
in an engine shutdown or continue to fire command. Based on this table, it can be determined which of the 
states has occurred. This process is performed N times and the frequency of occurrences of each state is 
maintained from which the true state probabilities can be approximated. 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 L Model 71 Model 81 
EXAMPLE: Suppose thattA.1 = 15 sec, tA,2 = 320 sec, tB,I = 1500 sec, tB.2 = 776 SeC, and tH 
= 420 sec. Then one has the situation where one sensor was disqualified, followed by a HPFT 
overtemperature event and the simulated state S7 is recognized as having occurred. If tH had been greater 
than 520 sec, then it is noted that state S2 would have occurred. 
A 
0.0003794 
0.0000546 
E. Numerical Results 
B 
5.232E-6 
7.463 E-7 
The 12 state probabilities are obtained by evaluating the equations in Table 2 using the four 
estimated parameters and setting the time variable to 520 sec. The integrals in these equations are evaluated 
numerically. These equations will be evaluated twice; once using the Model 71 sensor failure rates and 
once using the Model 8 1 sensor failure rates. The same estimates for the two Weibull parameters used for 
the time to HPFT overtemperature model will be used in each case. A comparison of these results will show 
what improvement in reliability has been achieved when changing from the Model 7 1 sensor to the Model 
81 sensor. 
A B 
0.001 138 0.0000 1 57 
0.0001638 0.000002239 
First, using the Model 71 parameters, one obtains 
P1 = 0.8927, P2 = 0.0793, P3 = 0.01442, P4 = 0.01075, 
P5 = 0.001761, P6 = 3.21E-4, P7 = 3.322E-4, P8 = 3.202E-4, 
P9 = 5.837E-6, P10 = 6.039E-5, P11 = 4.427E-6, P12 = 8.05E-7, 
and it is noted that P1 + P2 +...+ P12 = 1 as required. The probabilities of interest 
are determined by: 
A. The probability of erroneous engine shutdown is given by P6 + P9 
B. The probability of not detecting a HPIT overtemperature event is given by PI 1 + P12 
These results are tabulated below for the Model 7 1 and Model 8 1 sensors. The results are given for a 
single engine firing for 520 sec and three engines firing for 520 sec each. A number which is frequently of 
interest is N, where N is the solution to the equation 0.99 = ( l - ~ ) ~  and is interpreted as the number of 
continuous successes in a row (p is the probability of a failure) for which the probability of this sequence of 
successes is 0.99.  For example, the probability is 0.99 that 61 launches will occur without a single erron- 
eous engine shutdown using the Model 81 sensor. 
Probability 
I Single Engine (520 sec) I Three Engines N 
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Also of interest relative to engine testing are the following two conditional probabilities: 
A. The probability that an overtemperature event occurred, given that the engine was shut down is 
(P4 + P7 + PlO)/(P4 + P6 + P7 + P9 + PlO). 
B. The probability that an overtemperature event has not occurred, given that the engine was shut- 
down, is given by (P6 + P9)/(P4 + P6 + P7 + P9 + P IO). 
These results for the two sensor models are: 
Probability 
A B 
Model 71 0.9671 0.03293 
Model 81 0.9951 0.004874 
The parameters for HPFT overtemperature events and the Model 71 sensor failure rate estimates 
were used in the Monte Carlo simulation and 60 million (N = 6E7) 520 sec single engine firings were 
simulated which is equivalent to 20 million Shuttle flights. The estimates of the twelve state probabilities 
and 95 percent confidence intervals are given below. The column labeled by P, which are the exact prob- 
abilities obtained from the analytical model, are the numbers that compare the estimates 5. Also note that 
the confidence intervals do cover the exact probabilities as desired. 
95% Confidence Interval 
P1 
P2 
P3 
P4 
P5 
P6 
P7 
P8 
P9 
P10 
P11 
P12 
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P 
0.89267 123 
0.07930 107 
0.01441838 
0.01 075076 
0.001761 19 
0.00032 I02 
0.00033215 
0.00032022 
O.OOOO5 837 
0.00006039 
0.00000443 
0.00000080 
h 
P 
0.89264068 
0.07935365 
0.0 1440805 
0.0 1 073278 
0.00 1 763 28 
0.0003 1 962 
0.00033316 
0.00032 1 37 
0.000060 1 7 
0.000061 72 
0.00000467 
0.00000083 
Lower Upper 
0.89256234 
0.07928526 
0.0 1437790 
0.0 107067 1 
0.00 1 75267 
0.0003 1 509 
0.00032857 
0.00031683 
0.00005820 
0.00005973 
0.000004 1 2 
0.00000060 
0.8927 1902 
0.07942204 
0.0 1443820 
0.0 1075886 
0.00 1 77390 
0.000324 14 
0.0003 3780 
0.0003 2590 
0.000062 1 3 
0.00006370 
0.0000052 1 
0.00000 1 06 
CONCLUSION 
A mathematical model has been developed which makes it possible to realistically estimate the risk 
of flying the Space Shuttle with and without turbine discharge temperature redline protection. This model 
accurately describes the computer voting logic for handling all possible combinations of sensor failures and 
turbine overtemperature events and, thus, makes possible the estimation of both the probability of erron- 
eous engine shutdown and tigcS grobability of not detecting a fuel turbine overtemperature event. 
A companion Monte Carlo computer simulation was also programmed which verified that the 
analytical model is correct. The simulation is also useful in the study of parameter sensitivity and model 
assumptions. 
This investigation has provided estimates of the risk envolved in flying the Space Shuttle with and 
without SSME temperature redline protection which is necessary for making informed design and flight 
policy decisions concerning overtemperatures. 
Upon consideration of the merits of using temperature sensors to detect HPFT overtemperatures, it 
is seen that flight without redline protection entails the risk of an undetected overtemperature event which, 
for the given data set, is estimated to be 0.033. By using two temperature sensors in the HPFT to detect 
overtemperatures, the risk is reduced to 1.57E-5 using the Model 71 sensor (a factor of 2101) and to 2.2E-6 
using the Model 81 (a factor of 15,000). However, when temperature sensors are utilized, the risk of erron- 
eoiis engine shutddown is introduced, which is estimated to be 0.00114 for the Model 71 sensor and 
0.000164 for the Model 81 sensor. 
If an erroneous engine shutdown is considered to be as equally undesirable as an undetected 
overtemperature event, then one must compare the risk of a HPFT overtemperature event during flight 
without redline protection versus the risk of either an erroneous engine shutdown or an undetected HPFT 
overtemperature event during flight with redline protection. This comparison shows that the risk is reduced 
by a factor of 29 when the Model 7 1 sensors are used and a factor of 199 when the Model 8 1 sensor is used 
and, thus, flight with redline protection is highly recommended. 
It should be emphasized that these numerical results are based on the two referenced data sets and it 
is recommended that these results be periodically updated as new sensor and fuel turbine life statistics 
become available. 
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TABLE 1 .  THE TWELVE POSSIBLE STATES AND THE COMPUTER VOTING LOGIC 
: omp ut e r  
React ion State Description Comments State 
s1 
s2 
53 
54 
55 
S6 
s7 
S8 
s9 
s 10 
s11 
s12 
State Figure 
I
L 
T 
T 
No sensor failures 
No overtemperature event 
CTF* Nominal State 
One sensor disqualified CTF Loss of redundancy 
~ 
One sensor erroneously 
votes to cut 
CTF Loss of redundancy u
T 
HPFT overtemperature event SD ** Correct decision I H  
T 
u
T 
Both sensors disqualified CTF Flying with no 
protection 
One sensor disqualified, the 
other later erroneously votes 
to cut 
SD Erroneous engine 
shutdown 
SD Correct decision I I  H 
T 
One sensor disqualified, and 
sometime later, an over- 
temperature event 
One sensor votes to cut and 
then, sometime later, the 
other is disqualified 
CTF Flying w i t h  no 
protect ion uT 
SD Erroneous engine 
shut down uT One sensor erroneously votes to cut, and then sometime 
later, the other erroneously 
votes to cut 
One sensor erroneously votes 
to cut. Later, there is an 
overtemperature event 
SD Correct decision I H 
T 
___ 
Both sensors disqualified 
followed by an overtemperature 
One sensor erroneously votes 
to cut, the other is later 
disqualified, followed by an 
overtemperature event 
CTF I I I H  
T 
Undetected hot 
HPFT 
Undetected hot 
HPFT 
CTF I /  I H  
T 
Legend 
I 
/ 
H HPFT overtemperature event 
* Continue to Fire 
** Shutdown 
a failing sensor is disqualified 
a failing sensor erroneously votes to cut 
11 
TABLE 2. STATE PROBABILITIES 
PROBABILITY 
B * -2LT e - a T  P l ( T ) =  e 
"1 P2(T) = - -aT B ,-LT (1 - e -LT) L e  
B "2 -LT (1 - ,-LT) e - aT P3(T) = - L e  
P4(T) = (1 - e -aTB ,-2LT) - 2L e-axB e -2Lx dx 
0 
B 2 '1 -aT (1 - ,-LT)2 
L 
P5(T) = e 
B 
dx -Lx) -ax P6(T) = - e 
L 
0 
B 
P7(T) = 7 2A1f e-Lx (1 - e-Lx) aB x B - l  e - a x  dx 
0 
B 
(1 - '1'2 -aT P8(T) = - e 
L2 
B 2 
P 9 ( T ) =  '2 e -aT (1 - .-LT12 + -Lx)  e-ax dx 
B 2 
0 L 
B 
PlO(T) = - 2 x 2  JT e -Lx (1 - e-Lx) aB xB-1 e-ax dx 
L 
0 
B 
P11(T) = 7 e B 
L 
-LT)2 + 2x12 f e - L ~  - e -Lx)  e - a ~  dx -'l -aT (1 - e 2 
L 
0 
I 
I 
I 
STATE 
s1 
s2 
53 
s4 
s5 
S6 
s7 
S8 
s9 
s 10 
S l l  
s 1 2  
~- 
TABLE 3. SYSTEM STATES VERSUS FAILURE SCENARIOS 
FAILURE SCENARIOS 
COMPUTER 
DECISION 
C TF 
C TF 
CTF 
SD 
C T F  
SD 
SD 
CTF 
SD 
SD 
CTF 
C T F  
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TOR 
Figure la. SSME combustion devices. 
OXYGEN SIDE FUEL SIDE 
- -  
TEMPERATURE TEMPERATURE 
SENSORS 
Figure lb.  SSME hot gas manifold. 
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